Husserl Fenomenolojisinde Bilinç Yaşantıları ve Modifikasyon
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Tarih
2021
Yazarlar
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Yayıncı
BEYTULHİKME FELSEFE ÇEVRESİ, AŞAĞI ÖVEÇLER MAH, 1307 SOK NO 4-2, ÇANKAYA, ANKARA 06460, TURKEY
Erişim Hakkı
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 United States
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 United States
Özet
With this article, we want to discuss the place and importance of conscious experiences in Husserl's phenomenology in order to comprehend topics that will directly guide the clarification of concepts and problems such as; 'modality of consciousness', 'immediate intuition', 'reflection', 'visual experience', 'consciousness modification', 'meaning-making consciousness', wilfulness, 'seen act', 'grasped object', 'immanent perception', 'empty orientation', 'absolute form' etc. and to construe their consciousness modifications and their functions in reflection. In accordance with this purpose, we will try to answer the question of how we can establish our awareness of reflexive consciousness through unreflected conscious experiences. The phenomenological analysis of object perception will be touched on, and in particular, in the light of the views, he put forward in his "Ideas I" and "Logical Investigations-II", Husserl's relations of consciousness experiences and "vision", "intention" and "reflection" will be tackled together with the departure of Husserl's distinction between actual and potential experiences. With the movement from the distinction between 'reflexive consciousness' and 'pre-reflection consciousness of experiences', 'living experience' will be separated from 'visual experience', and 'remembering', 'daydreaming' etc. phenomenological analysis of consciousness modifications in activities will be done.
Açıklama
Anahtar Kelimeler
Phenomenology, conscious experiences, conscious modifications, modality of consciousness
Kaynak
Beytulhikme An International Journal of Philosophy
WoS Q Değeri
N/A
Scopus Q Değeri
Cilt
11
Sayı
3
