Hussain, SajidChaudhry, Shehzad Ashraf2023-11-102023-11-1020192327-4662https://hdl.handle.net/11363/6335https://doi.org/Very recently, Das et al. (IEEE Internet of Things Journal, pp. 4900–4913, 5(6), DOI: 10.1109/JIOT.2018.2877690, 2018) presented a biometric-based solution for security and privacy in Industrial Internet of Things architecture. Das et al. claimed that their protocol is secure against known attacks. However, this comment shows that their protocol is defenseless against stolen verifier, stolen smart device, and traceability attacks. The attacker having access to public parameters and any of the verifier and parameters stored in smart device can easily expose the session key shared among the user and the smart device. Moreover, their protocol fails to provide perfect forward secrecy. Finally, this article also provides some necessary guidelines on attack resilience for the authentication schemes based on merely the symmetric key primitives, which are overlooked by Das et al.eninfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 United StatesIndustrial Internet of Things (IIoT)insider attackperfect forward secrecysecret key exposestolen smart devicestolen verifier attackkey establishmentEditorial66109361094010.1109/JIOT.2019.29349472-s2.0-85076767464Q1WOS:000503985700139Q1